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I. Introduction 
 
On December 5th, 1936, the Supreme Soviet of USSR adopted and passed 
unanimously the first constitution of Soviet Union. This document proclaimed the 
"official birth" of the Soviet regime by officially legalizing the communist rule and 
establishing a comprehensive system of bureaucratic administration. This document is 
commonly granted the name "Stalin Constitution," since Stalin's personal influence, 
as well as the contemporary political structure created by him, profoundly influenced 
the draft, passage and publicizing of this document. In this paper, I will examine this 
highly disputed constitution in three aspects: the historical background and the 
various crises emerged in 1930s that motivated the Soviet Authority to make a 
constitution; a literal analysis of the Constitution's contents that demonstrate the 
efforts of Stalin’s Government to redistribute political resources, pacify social 
disorder and regulate different relationship among this huge multinational state; and 
finally, a brief summary of how this constitution contradicted the ideal expectation of 
Marxist theory, and how these deviations influence the future vicissitude of the 
nation's political development. Perceiving the Constitution as one part of a larger 
experiment to re-organize social order, I viewed the implementation of 1936 
Constitution not an isolated event, but rather as the inevitable result caused by the 
cohesive efforts of multiple prevailing social forces. 
II. A Medicine to Political Disease? 
Looking back on the Soviet Regime's rise to power, we can discover an interesting 
transition of attitude of Soviet leaders toward a constitution. In January 1918, facing 
the failure of election of Bolsheviks in Constitutional Convention, Lenin rejected the 
necessity of a constitution by claiming constitution as "a hypocrite capitalist tool for 
exploitation and oppression"[1]. He later forcibly dismissed the Constitutional 
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Convention and established a "People's Commission" which consisted solely of 
radical Communist revolutionaries. At the beginning of his tenure as the Party leader, 
Stalin also reasoned that "[The Constitution] will leave the party's supreme position 
unimpaired, and was therefore worthless as a guarantee of individual rights” [2]. 
However, by the year 1930, the Soviet government under Stalin suddenly determined 
to constitutionalize itself, marking a sharp contrast with his previous contemptuous 
and reluctant attitude. 
This apparent change of attitude significantly reflected the Soviet Government's 
difficulty in dealing with both domestic and international affairs. The success of the 
October Revolution did not bring an Communist utopia as Lenin originally expected; 
instead, when Joseph Stalin took office in 1922, four major problems that emerged 
during Russia's sudden change of social structure had severely threatened the internal 
instability of this new-born regime. 
The first problem was that Soviet authority's frequent change of agricultural 
policy had hurt the peasants' initiative of cultivation and resulted in stagnation of 
agriculture.  Between 1918 and 1927, the Soviet Union's official agriculture policy 
was revised three times. From 1918 to1921, Lenin practiced "war communism" in 
agriculture, or the requisition of agricultural surpluses from peasants in excess of 
absolute minimum for centralized distribution among the remaining population [3]; 
from 1921 to 1928, war communism was abolished for New Economic Policy (NEP), 
which cancelled the unpaid governmental collection of peasants' products and 
legalized farmers' possession of small plots of land and accessories; however, the 
lenient NEP was suddenly vetoed by Stalin in fall 1928 accusing a "Kulak dominance 
over rural areas” [4]. Stalin then started his agricultural collectivization plan by 
organizing individual peasants into collective farms where all private production 
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materials previously owned by them were confiscated for "public needs." By 
sacrificing the agricultural development to the need for industrialization, Soviet 
government obviously failed to keep their promise to the peasants to "guarantee their 
production rights and subsidize rurality.” 
 The Soviet government's rapid change of agricultural policy resulted in severe 
social consequences. Preoccupied by the fear that the Soviet government would 
expropriate their private property, Russian farmers generally lost their confidence 
toward production and were barely willing to cultivate more than their basic need [5]. 
Slaughtering livestock was also a common response of farmers to their unpredictable 
future. Farmers' habitual lack of productivity driven by their constant resistance to 
nationalization resulted in periodic famines and violent rebellions. A survey indicated 
that during the first decade of Soviet rule, 1918-1927, there were only 3 years of good 
harvests, 5 years of poor harvests and 2 famine years, a situation even worse than 
during the tsarist era in early 20th century. Accompanied by agricultural recession 
were constant explosion of riots and disobedience, which were best signified by the 
Ukranian Revolt of 1931 after a crop failure caused by governmental planning 
mistake, where peasants refused to cultivate in collective farms, robbed militia 
weapons and took over several administrative offices in adjacent areas [6]. 
Agriculture, as the major pillar of Russia's national economy, needed a coherent and 
legal policy to guarantee its healthy operation. 
Another problem exclusively significant in Stalin's ruling era is people's 
increasing dissatisfaction with the centralization of power in one person's hands. 
Different from his predecessor Lenin, who respected different voices inside the 
Communist Party and emphasized the democratic discussion of policy on the platform 
of Party Congress, Stalin's arbitrary personality make him intolerable to political 
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dissidents and public criticism. The existence of opponents inside the Politburo 
headed by Bukhalin and Zinoviev, Stalin strongly believed, potentially "undermined 
the strength of the ruling party" [7] and threatened his monopoly over 
decision-making. The dissidents' attacks on Stalin's construction method were 
multifaceted, including the low agricultural productivity in collective farms, extreme 
imbalance between industrial and agricultural development, arbitrary appointment of 
local officials, and his narrow interpretation of Marxist theory. Among these negative 
comments the most offensive to him is the accusation of his illegal grab of power, a 
voice announced by the boldest opponent Leon Trotsky, who argues that a party's 
leader cannot hold office without the consensus of its members, an opinion which 
severely attacked Stalin’s personal authority by questioning the essential source of his 
power.  
Learning the pragmatic political strategy from his predecessor Lenin, Stalin 
responded to the dissidents' request with fierce suppression through the secret police 
and stricter censorship of the press. However, he tried to legitimize and embellish his 
personal dictatorship on the other hand---an ironic fact in 1936 is that the Great Purge 
and the publication of Soviet Constitution took place nearly simultaneously. By 
comparing the nature of two major events, I perceive Stalin's proposal to publicize the 
Constitution in that critical time as an attempt to pacify public dissatisfaction with the 
Soviet authorities by making the Soviet structure seemingly more democratic and 
legally justified. 
Besides the economic and political dilemmas that the Stalin regime faced, the 
international community's reluctance to recognize USSR also contributed to the 
complexity of the problem. As early as 1919, the Palmer Raids marked the outbreak 
of anti-Soviet movement in the United States; the League of Nations established in 
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the same year consisted of western democracies but excluded Soviet Union's 
participation. Although western countries began to acknowledge and establish official 
relationships with USSR beginning in 1925, most of them still maintained a hostile 
attitude toward the nation by means of embargo, espionage activities and strict border 
inspection. The anti-Soviet mood among Western nations was rooted in the fear that a 
strong communist state adjacent to Europe would trigger further revolutions in their 
lands. They referred to Lenin's work The State and Revolution, which proclaimed 
Soviet Russia's mission to "export revolution" and to "assist world proletarians to 
achieve their political goals” [8]. Facing the isolation and suspicion of the rest of the 
world, Stalin realized that a worldwide revolution would never take place, and he 
tried to transform the role of Soviet Union from an iconoclastic trouble-maker to a 
responsible member of international community. A constitution, seen by Stalin as the 
symbol of order and authenticity, served as an effective tool to demonstrate the Soviet 
Union's peaceful will to the West and its promise to respect the existent diplomatic 
order. 
From the analysis above, the Soviet Constitution of 1936 was born in a 
complicated and uncertain historical context. As Trotsky said in The Revolution 
Betrayed, the Stalinist Russia is a "transitional state," whose collective, nationalized 
economy and autocratic politics differed from capitalist society, and whose low 
productivity and vast inequality of property made it distant from the idealistic 
communism in Marxist theory. Therefore, its instability in economics, politics and 
foreign affairs illustrated that the Soviet Union lacked a mature guide to regulate its 
socialist construction. The adoption of the Soviet constitution in this vulnerable period, 
therefore, is not coincidental, but conformed to the nation's need to appease 
socio-economic conflicts and to maintain resistant to future challenges. 
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 III. The Contents and Connotations of Constitution 
At the first glance, the Soviet Constitution had even more democratic 
characteristics than its western counterparts. It is the second constitution in the world 
to legalize women's suffrage, and also to guarantee the direct election of executive 
officials by the people. However, my argument in Part I reveals that the Constitution 
served to maintain social stability and reduce the mood of internal dissatisfaction and 
was not really an effort to democratize the Soviet state's political structure. Through 
the reading of the Stalin Constitution, I observe that Stalin had no intention to limit 
his absolute power in the framework of law, but tried to legitimize the authenticity of 
his ruling position and his bureaucracy with the authorization of a document. In order 
to comprehend the Stalin Constitution's political purpose, we need to discern its 
purpose beneath the surface of its context. 
The political clauses of the Constitution efficiently settled the contest between a 
highly-centralized bureaucracy and popular sovereignty. It nominally granted the 
nation's administrative power for "workers and peasants"[9], thus legitimizing the 
people's ownership over the nation; however, the Constitution also acknowledged the 
achievement of the "proletarian dictatorship," meaning that any person in opposition 
to the Soviet State perceived by its rulers could be suppressed justifiably. With this 
legal shield, Stalin craftily justified his purge of the Party as a constitutional means of 
"eliminating class enemies." Also, according to the Constitution, citizens ruled the 
nation through the elected representatives of the Supreme Soviet, who then passed the 
law and determined the candidates of executive branch. This delicate design of power 
was more beneficial to the ruler's dictatorship than to the common people's voice of 
opinions, since in an election lacking transparency and freedom of choice, autocratic 
leaders could easily converted their individual intentions to laws with the meek 
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cooperation of a rubber-stamp parliament. Therefore, Stalin successfully installed a 
democratic form on the nation's centralized structure without damaging the existent 
governing order. 
Another characteristic of the Constitution's political statement is its deliberate 
blurring of the Communist Party's presence in the political structure. Unlike 
Brezhnev's revised version in 1976, the Stalin Constitution did not mention anything 
about the Party-State relationship in the text, making the Party's actual leadership an 
"invisible hand" in the nation's political life. Although the Party was not offered legal 
status to rule, the Soviet Parliament which "exercises all rights vested in the USSR" 
were nevertheless controlled by its party caucus initiating proposals of law and 
"recommending" proper candidacy for leading positions [10].  
A similar evasiveness also occurred in the Constitution's description of the 
relationship between the Union and the Union Republics. The Constitution ensured 
each Republic's independence and sovereignty. It also exerted the Supreme Soviet's 
overall power of the nation at the same time, but did not explicitly offer a resolution 
when the central governments' opinions conflict with regional interests. In the actual 
practice, this condition would never happen, since the central government 
monopolized the appointment of all the leading positions of Union Republics. These 
two examples demonstrated the two-sided nature of the constitution: it provided an 
apparent democratic reform of Soviet Union's political structure, but indeed helped 
legalizing Stalin regime's monopoly of national power.  
The Constitution also highlighted its economic clauses, which were recognized as 
the most successful part in this document. Compared with previous economic policies, 
the Constitution legalized the systematic adjustment of agricultural collectivization 
implemented in 1927-1936. Although the agricultural clause maintained the 
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nationalized nature of Soviet farms and accessories, it attempted to raise collective 
farmers' working initiative by allowing the possession of a "small private economy of 
individual peasants and handcraftsman based on their personal labor." Additionally, 
they were legally guaranteed to acquire "incomes from work and their savings" [11], 
officially ending the forced expropriation of private belongings since 1918. The 
economic clauses signified the Stalin regime's abandonment of economic radicalism 
which emphasized the implementation of fundamental communist principles, 
regardless of Russian's agricultural reality. 
 However, the economic clauses were never created solely for the well-being of 
working people; it is no more than a practical compromise by Soviet leadership to 
moderate the increasingly resentful mood among peasants and retrieve the low 
agricultural productivity due to producers’ unwillingness to labor. As a method to 
rescue the Soviet economy from collapsing, the economic clause was nevertheless far 
from perfect. By announcing that "the economic life of the U.S.S.R. is determined and 
directed by the State National Economic Plan," the Constitution legalized the Soviet 
authority's control over the nation's economic activities and virtually deprived the 
citizens of the union republics of their rights of self-regulation. The Constitution also 
failed to address the extreme imbalance of industrial and agricultural development 
caused by "price scissors," the policy of intentionally exploiting agricultural profits to 
subsidize heavy industry. 
Another chapter in the Constitution specifically elucidated the rights of Soviet 
citizens, a part frequently cited by Stalin to prove the regime's "most democratic" 
nature. This part was the most enlightening in the Constitution, since it perfectly 
exemplified how an authoritarian government legitimized its suppression of 
individual members of society. Admittedly, the “rights clauses” [12] voiced to protect 
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individual political freedom, including speech, religion, assembly and demonstrations, 
but those rights were immediately limited by a vague statement in Article 135 that "it 
is the duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. to abide by the Constitution of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, to observe the laws, to maintain labor discipline, 
honestly to perform public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist intercourse." 
This clause tacitly stated that anyone who holds dissident opinions or actions against 
the Soviet authority's commands and orders will be "constitutionally" deprived of 
those inalienable rights. Since the extension of "rules of socialist intercourse," "labor 
discipline" or "public duties" were not clearly defined, Soviet rulers could apply those 
ambiguous restrictions to any speeches or actions considered by them as dangerous to 
their ruling order. The Soviet citizens have only the rights of conformation, but not 
resistance. With the authorization of these clauses, the Stalin regime rationalized its 
censorship of press and publications, and virtually eliminated the possibility of a labor 
strike or a demonstration. 
Through the analysis of four major parts of Constitution, I perceive that the 1936 
Constitution served more as a proclamation of the communist rule, rather than the 
nation's basic law. Positively, it responded to domestic unrest by making promises to 
extend people's political and economic rights, and for the first time it provided clear 
answers to essential problems on the Soviet state's social organization and distribution 
of property. Nevertheless, designed originally to better the Stalin regime's operation of 
a dictatorship, this constitution used plenty of ambiguous statements throughout its 
body, creating abundant "empty spaces" for rulers to interpret its actual meaning and 
implementation. The deliberate lack of detail in the Stalin Constitution may explain 
why the so-called "most democratic document" was too enfeebled to prevent people 
from suffering the Great Purge and later catastrophes. 
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IV. Conclusion: Is 1936 Constitution as Expected to Be? 
After observing the Soviet authority's basic principles and intentions enumerated 
in the 1936 Constitution in previous chapters, I will compare the Soviet political 
practice with the theoretical, idealistic form of Communism in Marx's work to reveal 
the Soviet regime's structural difference from the theoretical model. I will also try to 
prove how the Soviet practice of communism thoroughly influenced 20th century's 
socialist movement and resulted in the sudden collapse of the Communist nation in 
early 1990s.  
Firstly, Stalin regime's perception of democracy showed in the 1936 Constitution 
was different from the orthodox Marxist view. Article 2 of the document defined the 
nation's political foundation as "the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat," 
emphasizing the term "dictatorship" 17 years after the success of October Revolution. 
Stalin claimed that the dictatorship was necessary even in a peaceful era, since “the 
socialist state had the responsibility to carry out the class struggle against class 
enemies and preserve the revolutionary achievements.”  
However, as famous political scientist Sigmund Kransberg argued, Marx "is 
defended with firm claims to certainty as the champion of democracy," who stated 
that worker's dictatorship over the nation is but "a transitional institution used in the 
struggle, in the revolution, to hold down one's adversaries by force" [13]. Therefore, 
Stalin had adopted an falsified adaptation of Marxism, which has little to nothing in 
common with the words and actions of Marx himself. 
Also driven by the "proletarian dictatorship" principles, the severe restriction of 
civil liberty in Soviet Union was also in conflict with Marxist theory of social 
organization. A victim of press censorship himself, Karl Marx strictly criticized the 
limitation of the freedom of speech as a blatant abuse of government power, 
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perceiving it to be "a trick used by the capitalist class to suppress the voice of 
progressive proletarians." However, the Great Purge began in 1936 apparently 
contrasted the Marxist dream of personal liberty. In that bloody movement, Stalin 
executed and imprisoned millions of political dissidents, while using strict censorship 
methods to take absolute control of Soviet newspaper agencies and public radio. 
Under the tyrannical power, the constitutional protection on civilian freedom was 
proved only to be ineffective. 
In the economic field, the original Marxist doctrine also differed greatly from 
Stalin's communist practice. Article 12 provided the principle of distribution applied 
in the U.S.S.R. to be "from each according to his ability, to each according to his 
work." Although this clause differed from the Marxist teaching that "from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his need" by only one word, the principle 
of property distribution was fundamentally changed. Marx based his distribution 
theory on the assumption that communism was a highly prosperous and productive 
society where people were highly initiated and skillful to their work. However, the 
Soviet state was a poor agricultural nation without an abundant source of products for 
Soviet people to obtain whatever they need. Devoted to adapting the nation's low 
productivity to the communist rule, Stalin pragmatically used the phrase "to each 
according to his work" to both declare the socialist nature of Soviet Union and 
recognize the real economic condition of the state. In practical terms, it actually 
indicated that proper were not paid equally. 
The huge gap between Soviet socialist practice and Marxist theory, as 
demonstrated in 1936 Constitution, has a complicated historical root. The long-lasting 
Tsarist dictatorship which begun in the medieval era deeply influenced the social 
model of Russian State, not only establishing a strict system of hierarchy but also 
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fostering a tradition of personality cult and public allowance to absolute power. 
Unlike liberal democracy in the West, the ruling power in Old Russia was not granted 
and consented by people, but disseminated exclusively by the Tsar to the lower levels 
of the social pyramid, creating a top-down model of power distribution. In order to 
maintain the stability of this ruling order, it is necessary for dictators to "tame" 
common people, making them submissive and responsive to royal commands and 
pacifying their requests to participate in political issues. Political suppression, the 
religious teachings of Eastern Orthodox and the recognition of loyalty as a moral 
virtue served as ideological tools for the tsars to maintain social order and mitigate 
popular dissent.  
Although the October Revolution overthrew the empire's tyranny and established 
an apparently populist regime, the profound Tsarist tradition in Russia was not 
eliminated by the 1917 revolution but rather deeply implanted itself into the newborn 
regime, making it partially a continuation of the dead empire. Leninism, the adoption 
of Marxist theory to Russia's specific circumstance, replaced the moral and religious 
teaching in Old Empire to be a new tool of restricting the free minds of Soviet people; 
the powerful bureaucracy in Russian Empire to execute real power, such as the Royal 
Court and National Duma, was virtually transformed to a system of Party bureaucracy 
and Soviet legislation, which was equally suppressive but wrapped in a democratic 
coat; the feudal partition of social classes according to blood lineage and land 
possession were claimed to be replaced by a non-class proletarian society, but the 
Communist leadership headed by Stalin nevertheless formed itself a new "proletarian 
nobility" who centralized the national power and enjoyed diverse social privileges as 
the former royalty did. In his book The Court of the Red Tsar, historian Simon 
Montefiore described the Stalin regime as a modern reflection of tsar heritage and 
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reminded people to analyze Communist Russia's inevitable conversion from a 
populist democracy to an authoritarian empire in a cultural sense. In conclusion, the 
1936 Constitution was deeply attached to the previous tsarist path and thereby its 
inadequate fulfillment of Marx’s ideal social organization seems inevitable. 
Despite the Constitution's many disadvantages, the USSR was the first successful 
example of the communist movement in 20th century, and the document provided a 
powerful model for governmental structure and civil policy in later proletarian states. 
Observing Yugoslavia, Albania and democratic Germany's constitutions as marked 
examples, one can distinguish three common characteristics derived from the Stalin 
Constitution: the claim of the proletarian dictatorship against the residue capitalists, 
which granted the communist parties the absolute legitimacy to rule; the building of a 
Soviet-styled legislative branch consisted of elected representatives under the Party's 
supervision; the official adoption of a centralized planned economy and the mass 
nationalization of industry. Similar to the route of Soviet Union, those nations 
achieved a remarkable development in economy and social construction due to the 
stabilizing effect of the constitutions, but the political transparency and individual 
liberty, lacking substantial legal protection, were little improved. The Soviet model of 
constitutionality was applied to a wide range of socialist nations, which extended to 
all the member states of Warsaw Pact after the Soviet Union's 21st Party Congress.  
The Stalin Constitution existed for 31 years before its final replacement by 
Brezhnev's 1977 Constitution. The previous discussions on this document's historical 
significance pointed to the essential topic of this essay: did the 1936 Constitution of 
USSR fulfill its initial expectations? As a political proclamation, it is brilliant, since it 
successfully pacified the internal turbulence of USSR and strengthened the 
Communist party's authority to rule. Providing several principles for regulating the 
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Party-State relationship and the collaboration among different functional branches, the 
Constitution established a systematic mechanism for the political operation of the 
huge country; as an economic blueprint, it is positively influential, because the central 
planned economy was officially adopted as the nation's fundamental policy, which 
fixed the nation's formerly changing nature of economic system since the Bolshevik 
Revolution. Although it settled the problem of extreme unbalance of industrial and 
agricultural investments in Soviet economy, both industries marked a breakthrough of 
rapid development during the late 1930s inspired by a lenient economic policy. 
However, as a fundamental law regulating governmental behavior, the Constitution 
was poorly applied. As section 3 of this paper stated, the articles guaranteeing people's 
basic rights and democracy enumerated in 1936 Constitution was largely a 
hypocritical exhibition of the regime's mercifulness to respect the popular will, a 
strategy to strengthen, not restrict the regime's exercise of power. The large-scale 
purge of political dissidents which began in 1937 ironically revealed the 
Constitution's inability to protect political dissidents from being suppressed by the 
Stalin authority's iron-fisted tyranny. In a totalitarian state where the dictator 
possessed absolute power, any legal system would lose its original function to 
"balance the public democracy and individual rights." As a final response to the topic 
question, the Stalin Constitution is exactly the ruling apparatus expected by Stalin and 
Soviet leaders, but is not the domestic law expected by a modern democratic 
legislator. 
Although the USSR, an enduring communist experiment aiming at reorganizing 
the capitalist society, ended its life in a miserably at the end of 20th century, its 
achievements and failures have been a permanent focus for European historians to 
survey. The economic miracle created by planned national economy, the highly 
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centralized operation of politics, and the marvelous utopia described in 1936 
Constitution, never ceased to influence the present and the future. 
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